Crusading Realism:

The Bush Doctrine and American Core Values after 9/11

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The founders (Washington through Monroe for our purposes) did not agree on everything, but there were core principles that almost all, if not all, agreed on when it came to the beginnings of American democracy and American foreign policy. First, they were believers in natural law and particularly in the salient idea that liberty is a gift from God to man. 

The Al Qaeda  attacks on September 11^th, 2001 precipitated the most dramatic changes in United States foreign policy. The resulting Bush Doctrine of Crusading Realism is a fusion of pragmatic realism and idealistic fervor. 

This demarcation of the line between good and evil was seen in Bush long before 9/11. 

The new Bush Doctrine  would bring to fruition a ‘Republic at home and an empire abroad.’ Uniquely, it would not be an empire of territorial ambition, but one of ideological expansion, culminating in the promotion of the fundamental idea of the American founders: the natural order of all human beings is one of liberty under law, regardless of where, who, or when they exist. 

I argue that the Bush Doctrine, and thus Crusading Realism, returns the United States to the very cornerstone of American values, the ideas of the Declaration of Independence and natural law. In other words, the natural law arguments of the 18th century are reborn in 21st century America caused by Islamic extremism, the threat of "WMD," and the presence of rogue regimes  – the "toxic nexus."

The failure to tackle Al Qaeda  during the Clinton years was systemic, running from the President of the United States himself all the way down to the lowest levels of foreign policy and defense. 

Why, after all the intelligence reports, terrorist attacks, fatwas, and threats, and given that, as the 9/11 Commission points out, plans by Al Qaeda throughout the 1990s were developed with an ‘unwavering single-mindedness’, with calls to violence public and private since 1992, was no action taken? One explanation is that the Clinton administration wanted cast-iron proof that all of these attacks were the work of Bin Laden and they wanted the national security organizations to stand up and take responsibility for saying it. Another explanation is that their law enforcement mentality viewed terrorism as a crime, which called for the same kind of evidence that one would need to prosecute in an American courtroom–certainly Berger and Albright saw Bin Laden primarily as a ‘fugitive from justice. 

Iraq was seen as a practical solution–it had a military option. In looking at the ‘Axis of Evil’, the country that was in the ‘best’ position for being the subject of a successful American invasion appeared to be Iraq. Iran  would have been more difficult (on all levels, not just militarily), and North Korea-posed a devastating threat to South Korea and Japan. Iraq could be done, and it could then be used against the other two. 

This path would lead directly to the decision that America, fueled by her primacy in international relations, would confidently launch a war to bring about regime change in Iraq.

This was an important change, but the real innovation of the Crusading Realists was in prevention. It will be debated for some time whether or not the Bush administration made the right decision in cloaking prevention under cover of preemption. However, prevention is clearly what the doctrine called for, as illustrated by the decision to invade Iraq. It may be the prime mover in a future decision to remove the Iranian regime. 

These three–primacy, preemption, and prevention–would have sustained the new policy of ‘assertive nationalism’, but it is the last pillar of the Bush Doctrine that is the strongest and most controversial, and which conjoins realism with idealism. President Bush’s intervention on a personal and professional level elevated democracy promotion to the highest aspiration of his policy. 

One of the striking aspects of the Bush Doctrine, to both critics and proponents, is its use of stark, absolute imagery of good  and evil, light and dark, stemming from George Bush’s own religious and moral views. 

This is especially important, since neither Iran  nor North Korea would serve the idea of transforming the Arab Middle East. Iraq was thus the natural choice among the three rogue states. Nevertheless, as of this writing, Iran may very well be headed for the exact same chopping block upon which the Baathists placed their heads. Iran, as a Persian and Shiite state would be a springboard for nothing at the ideological or geopolitical level (regarding Islam  and democracy), though it could eventually serve as an example of the ultimate use of preemption/prevention against the toxic nexus. North Korea, as a sclerotic throwback to mid-20^th century Stalinism, is no one’s idea of a heralded example of anything other than what not do and what not to be. It poses no ideological threat to the west and is of interest purely because it seeks to behave internationally as a criminal and potential exporter of WMD. Thus, although Iran and North Korea are clear and present dangers to American national security, they did not provide nearly the same object lesson that Iraq could. 

In short the attempt to label the Bush Doctrine neo-conservative is akin to a man filling a small bottle by using Niagara Falls; one is left with an overwhelming feeling of too much effort for such a little return. It simply does not pass muster, and the ink spilled over this non-issue would be mind-boggling if it were not so tragic and useless.

Preface (partial)

This book had a single inspiration: the smoking twin towers. The event was a catalyst that created the single most important shift in American national security strategy in fifty years by returning us to our revolutionary war roots. The purpose of this book is to explain and illustrate this shift in what many have labeled the Bush Doctrine. There have been many books and articles on the Bush Doctrine, but none that make the argument herein. I argue that the Bush Doctrine, and thus Crusading Realism, returns the United States to the very cornerstone of American values, the ideas of the Declaration of and natural law. In other words, the natural law  arguments of the 18th century are reborn in 21st century America caused by Islamic extremism, the threat of WMD, and the presence of rogue regimes–the toxic nexus  .

The specific questions I asked prior to writing this book were many and gigantic in scope. Why did the U.S. engage in the war on terror? What were the philosophical foundations of President Bush’s foreign policy? Was there a Bush Doctrine? Why both the war on terror and the invasion of Iraq  were grounded in past failures by the U.S.? What exactly was the shift in American Grand National security strategy? The chapter on Iraq is a novel approach to looking at that conflict, completely missed by much of the world media.

The title itself, Crusading Realism, became the argument. A bridging of the gap between the traditional ideas in international relations and foreign policy that have rested in the United States primarily on liberalism and realism, which Crusading Realism  upturns. The 1990s, the years of strategic drift, were an appalling disaster for American national security, in many ways creating the conditions for the catastrophic events in and around 9/11. It is this unique reaction by President Bush to this dangerous problem that becomes Crusading Realism. The reader should understand that the book has a definite beginning and an end and will immediately realize that I do not deal with the events immediately following the first shots fired in the war against Saddam Hussein's  Baathist dictatorship. This book is therefore not about the invasion or liberation of Iraq , but rather, the reasons that led to the invasion and the general war on terrorism and Islamic Bolshevism. Critics may hang on to this in a desperate attempt to deconstruct the arguments made here in a further effort to caricature President Bush, Vice President Cheney and their administration rather than deal with serious issues of national security policy and philosophy.

This work is a result of years of exhaustive research of poring through declassified documents, exclusive interviews and a mountain of books, articles and monographs.

United States Foreign Policy As a Presidential Construct 

The global war on terror, launched by the events of September 11th, 2001, shifted the foreign policy of the United States towards a more aggressive, confrontational, and idealistic position. This book will discuss the politics of foreign policy leading up to that date, as well as the shift in policy that took place from 2001 to 2003. There are four facets to the problem: (1) Comparison of United States security policy prior to and post 9/11 ; (2) Decisions made as a result of 9/11 to change national security policy; (3) United States pressure and reaction to those security policy changes; and (4) The roots, emergence, development and implementation of the Bush Doctrine. Discussion of these four facets will highlight the significance of the shift in United States foreign policy that followed September 11th. 

The book will explore the basic foundations of American foreign policy, specifically national security policy, during the later part of the Clinton administration and outline the goals that the administration had concerning security, asking whether there was an overall strategy to deal with security threats such as terrorism. The book then moves on to the early years of the George W. Bush presidency, and examines the policies that were in place on September 11, 2001 to repel attacks against the United States. The greater part of the research focuses on the events from September 11, 2001 to March 19, 2003 when the United States initiated hostilities against the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein  in Iraq, and will discuss the fundamental shift that 9/11 caused in American national security and foreign policy, and examine the political significance on the Bush Doctrine.

The question of the Bush Doctrine is significant for four reasons. First, security policy changes have the most dramatic effect and potential for conflict among the great powers themselves and between them and the United States. Second, the reasons for these changes can be readily isolated, to better understand and anticipate future policy options and consideration. Third, as new avenues of conflict have emerged due to these security policy changes, so have new avenues of opportunity, which may lead to long-term economic, political, and military shifts in the balance of power and in international relationships. Fourth, the war on terror will continue for the near future, and so will be of primary security concern to all powers.  

The President as Primary Foreign Policy Maker 

United States foreign policy, especially in the modern age, is essentially a presidential creation. Since 1945, successive presidents have been the primary actors in planning, directing, and conducting American foreign affairs. This is fundamentally due to the nature of the United States Constitution and the use of presidential powers as outlined in Article I. The president is sole commander-in-chief of the armed forces and is solely responsible for diplomacy, treaty creation and enforcement, and homeland security. This is amplified by statute and custom whereby the president has amassed power over institutions that were not explicitly described in the Constitution, such as the intelligence community, the various trade offices, and (most critically for our purposes) the National Security Council  (NSC). However, different presidents are more or less comfortable with this power. President Bush's management style is executive-driven and thus, when we look at the Bush Doctrine, we are fundamentally dealing with President Bush not as a “first among equals,” but as the primary actor above all.

As will be shown in later chapters, President Bush took charge of his presidency from the beginning, and 9/11  seemed to instill in him a personal and professional sense of mission. It was precisely for September 11th, he has commented many times, that he had won the presidency. This does not mean that President Bush is a micromanager. On the contrary, this is a President who sets out grand strategy and expects others to follow it. Noting that he is the first American president to possess an MBA, as presidential scholars Chris Dolan and David Cohen state that:

In a 2003 study of President Bush's foreign policy decisions, William Crotty compared the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962 to 9/11  and following. He found that, even within the prevalent norms of presidentially-directed, U.S. foreign policy, President Kennedy’s decision-making could be considered much more collective than the unilateralism  of George W. Bush. Crotty compares Bush to a Prussian field marshal orchestrating his cabinet (sometimes with a symbolic baton), among whom loyalty, secrecy, and closed-door decision making are the watchwords.^[3] He also makes a business comparison:

The overall picture is that the President’s subordinates–the most powerful men and women in the government, from the NSC  “National Security Council”  advisor to the Attorney General–lived as lieutenants who were expected to jump when asked and only question how high. John Ashcroft, his Attorney General during this period, stated that either you fulfilled your commitments to him on time or you had better have a very good reason why you could not. He was a taskmaster: 

Much of what we know about President Bush’s view of the world and foreign affairs comes from his speeches. Consistently, Bush’s speeches express his beliefs. Again, serious scholars and analysts see no duplicity, even if they abhor the policy itself. In an article analyzing Bush’s rhetoric, political scholars Bligh, Kohles, and Meindl used quantitative analysis to review Bush’s pre- and post 9/11  speeches and statements, concluding that that he has been more decisive, firmly in command, and more convinced of his perceived mission after 9/11.